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ABSTRACT 
Boudoukh,  Richardson,  and  Whitelaw  (BRW) presented  theoretical  and 
empirical  evidence  explaining  the  expected  inflation/stock  return 
correlation.  In  concluding  they  stated  that  whether  monetary 
policy  has  real  effects  is an  open  question.  This  paper  addresses 
this  question  by  examining  how  BRW's  industry  stock  return  data 
respond  to monetary  policy  shocks.  Monetary  policy  is measured  by 
innovations  in the  federal  funds  rate  and  nonborrowed  reserves,  by 
narrative  indicators,  and  by  an  event  study  of  Federal  Reserve 
policy  changes.  In  every  case  the  evidence  indicates  that 
expansionary  policy  increases  ex-post  stock  returns.  Results  from 
estimating  a  multi-factor  model  also  indicate  that  exposure  to 
monetary  policy  increases  an  asset's  ex-ante  return. IN  AN  INGENIOUS  PAPER,  Boudoukh,  Richardson,  and  Whitelaw 
(1994)  investigated  the  cross-sectional  relation  between  expected 
inflation  and  industry  stock  returns.  They  described  a  money- 
neutral  model  in  which  a  stock's  expected  inflation  beta  should 
depend  positively  on  the  correlation  between  the  stock's  expected 
dividend  growth  and  expected  inflation  (pgR). Building  on  Fama's 
(1981)  trproxy"  hypothesis,  they  argued  that  there  is  a  negative 
relationship  between  pgx  and  the  degree  of  cyclicality  of  an 
industry.  Cyclicality  was  measured  by  the  correlation  between 
industry  output  growth  and  aggregate  output  growth  (the industry's 
output  beta).  Consistent  with  their  theory,  they  found  that  there 
is  a  clear  negative  relationship  between  a  stock's  expected 
inflation  beta  and  the  corresponding  industry's  output  beta.  In 
their  conclusion  they  stated  that  whether  monetary  policy  affects 
the  real  economy,  and  whether  its  effects  are  quantitatively 
important,  remain  open  questions. 
This  paper  addresses  these  questions  by  examining  the  effects 
of  monetary  policy  innovations  on  the  industry  stock  return  data 
used  by  Boudoukh,  Richardson,  and  Whitelaw  (BRW).  Theory  posits 
that  stock  prices  equal  the  expected  present  value  of  future  net 
cash  flows.  Thus  evidence  that  positive  monetary  shocks  increase 
industry  stock  returns  indicates  that  expansionary  monetary  policy 
exerts  real  effects  by  increasing  future  cash  flows  or  by 
decreasing  the  discount  factors  at  which  those  cash  flows  are 
capitalized. 
To examine  the  relationship  between  monetary  policy  and  stock 
returns  a variety  of empirical  techniques  are  employed.  Impulse- 2 
response  functions  and  variance  decompositions  from  a  vector 
autoregression  indicate  that  there  is  a  large  and  statistically 
significant  relationship  between  either  negative  shocks  to  the 
federal  funds  rate  or  positive  shocks  to  nonborrowed  reserves  and 
subsequent  increases  in industry  stock  returns.  Generalized  method 
of moments  estimation  reveals  that  narrative  evidence  of a monetary 
expansion  is  also  strongly  correlated  with  increases  in  stock 
returns.  An  event  study  of  changes  by  the  Federal  Reserve  in  its 
federal  funds  rate  target  provides  additional  evidence  that  a 
monetary  expansion  increases  stock  returns.  Finally  nonlinear 
seemingly  unrelated  regression  estimation  of  a multi-factor  model 
indicates  that  monetary  policy,  as  measured  both  by  federal  funds 
rate  innovations  and  by  narrative  measures,  is a common  factor  and 
that  assets  must  pay  a  positive  risk  premium  to  compensate  for 
their  exposure  to  it.  These  results  support  the  hypothesis  that 
monetary  policy,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  has  real  and 
quantitatively  important  effects  on  the  economy. 
The  next  Section  discusses  the  data  and  methodology  employed 
here.  Section  II presents  the  results.  Section  III  concludes  and 
discusses  the  implications  of the  findings  for  further  research  in 
financial  economics. 3 
I.  Data  and  Methodology 
A.  Vector  Autoregression  Evidence  of  Monetary  Policy  and  Stock 
Returns 
The  vector  autoregression  (VAR) methodology  has  proven  useful 
for  investigating  the  relationship  between  stock  returns  and  other 
variables  (see,  e.g.,  Lee  (1992)).  This  involves  regressing  an  n 
by  1  vector  of  endogenous  variables,  YiI  on  lagged  va  lues  of 
itself: 
Yt  =  f&y,_,  +  .  .  . + Apyt_p  + E,,  E(&,&,')  =  fi.  (1) 
Assuming  that  yt  is  covariance  stationary,  equation  (1)  can  be 
inverted  and  represented  as  an  infinite  vector  moving  average 
process: 
Yt=  E,  +  rIl&,_i  +  I-r,&,_)  +  r&E,_,  +  .  .  .  .  (2) 
Since  the  variance-covariance  matrix  of  Ed  (fi)  is  symmetric  and 
positive  definite,  the  Cholesky  factorization  implies  that  there 
exists  a  lower  triangular  matrix  P  such  that  n  =  PP'.  Using  P, 
equation  (2) can  be  rewritten: 
Yt  =  PP_'&, + r&PP-k_,  t  rIzPP_I&,_,  t  .  .  .  =  1-&  t  I&_,,  + 
r21&  t  .  .  .  (3) 
where  Ti = l&P, 2),  = P-I&,,  and  E[U,Z),‘]  =  I.  Equation  (3) represents 
the  endogenous  variables  (yt) as  functions  of  the  orthogonalized 
innovations  (u,_i)  .  One  can  also  determine  the  percentage  of  each 
variable's  forecast  error  variance  that  is  attributable  to 
innovations  in  each  of  the  endogenous  variables.' 
Bernanke  and Blinder  (1992),  employing  this  VAR  approach,  used 4 
the  federal  funds  rate  to  measure  monetary  policy.  Evidence  from 
variance  decompositions  and  Granger  causality  tests  indicated  that 
the  funds  rate  forecasted  unemployment,  industrial  production,  and 
other  real  variables  well  over  the  1959:7  -  1989:12  period.  This 
is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  monetary  policy  exerts  an 
important  effect  on  real  variables.  However,  other  researchers 
(e.g.,  Sims  (1992))  presented  evidence  that  casts  doubt  on  the 
hypothesis  that  federal  funds  rate  shocks  were  useful  for 
identifying  monetary  policy  changes.  Specifically,  these  authors 
found  that  when  the  funds  rate  was  placed  first  in  a  Cholesky 
ordering,  positive  innovations  in  the  funds  rate  were  correlated 
with  subsequent  increases  in inflation.  This  increase  in inflation 
in response  to a "contractionary"  policy  shock  has  been  labeled  the 
"price  puzzle".  As  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  (1994)  have 
discussed,  this  response  could  occur  because  the  Fed  is using  some 
indicator  of  inflation  that  the  econometrician  is not  including  in 
the  VAR.  If the  Fed  tightens  policy  in response  to  this  indicator 
and  if  the  tightening  only  affects  inflation  with  a  lag  then 
contractionary  policy  will  appear  to  be  correlated  with  higher 
future  inflation.  Christian0  et  al.  found  that  including  an  index 
of  sensitive  commodity  prices  as  an  additional  indicator  of 
inflation  eliminated  the  price  puzzle  and  caused  positive 
innovations  in  the  funds  rate  to  be  associated  with  subsequent 
decreases  in  the  price  level. 
This  identification  strategy  of Christian0  et al.  is used  here 
to  model  monetary  policy  shocks.  A  monthly  VAR  with  the  growth 5 
rate  of  industrial  production,  the  inflation  rate,  the  log  of  a 
commodity  price  index,  the  federal  funds  rate,  the  log  of 
nonborrowed  reserves,  the  log  of  total  reserves,  stock  returns,  a 
constant,  and  six  lags  is estimated.  Orthogonalized  innovations  in 
the  funds  rate  are  used  to  measure  monetary  policy.  Following 
Christian0  et al.  the  order  of orthogonalization  is the  same  as the 
order  in which  the  variables  are  listed  above.  In addition,  since 
the  Federal  Reserve  targeted  nonborrowed  reserves  (NBR)  over  the 
October  1979  - August  1982  period,  orthogonalized  innovations  in 
NBR  are  used  to  measure  monetary  policy  over  this  period.'  When 
NBR  is  used  to  measure  monetary  policy,  it  is placed  ahead  of  the 
federal  funds  rate  in  the  recursive  ordering. 
The  stock  return  data  are  for the  22 industries  that  BRW  used. 
These  data  come  from  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices 
(CRSP)  database  and  include  firms  traded  for any  full  calendar  year 
over  the  1953-1990  period.  Firms  are  sorted  into  industries  based 
on  two-digit  SIC  codes  and  industry  portfolio  returns  are  equally 
weighted  averages  of  the  returns  on  individual  firms. 
To  investigate  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  shocks  on  these 
portfolios  both  impulse  responses  and  innovation accounting  methods 
are  used.  Since  forward-looking  investors  should  quickly 
capitalize  the  implications  of  monetary  policy  shocks  for  future 
cash  flows  and  discount  factors,  the  initial  period  response  of 
stock  returns  to  a  monetary  policy  shock  is  examined.  Standard 
errors  for these  coefficients  are calculated  by Monte  Carlo  methods 
using  300  draws  from  the  posterior  distribution  of  the 6 
orthogonalized  impulse  responses  (see  Doan  (1992)).  Since 
financial  economists  have  found  that  stock  returns  are  somewhat 
forecastable  (see  Campbell  and  Ammer  (1993)  and  the  references 
contained  therein),  the  percent  of  the  24-month  forecast  error 
variance  of  stock  returns  explained  by  monetary  policy  shocks  is 
also  examined.  Standard  errors  are  again  calculated  using  the 
Monte  Carlo  methods  discussed  by  Doan  with  300  draws  from  the 
posterior  distribution. 
Apart  from  stock  returns,  data  for  the  other  variables  were 
obtained  from  the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape  (the  mnemonics  for 
these  variables  are  listed  in  Table  II).  Since  data  on  commodity 
prices  are  available  from  Haver  Analytics  beginning  in January  1967 
and  since  the  BRW  industry  stock  return  data  extend  to  December 
1990,  the  estimation  using  federal  funds  rate  innovations  to 
measure  monetary  policy  was  performed  over  the  1967:l  -  1990:12 
period.3 
B.  Narrative  Evidence  of Monetary  Policy  and  Stock  Returns 
Another  approach  to  identifying  monetary  shocks  was  pioneered 
by  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963).  They  used  Federal  Reserve 
statements  and other  historical  documents  over  the  1867-1960  period 
to  identify  exogenous  changes  in monetary  policy  and  the  responses 
of  real  variables.  Romer  and  Romer  (1989)  extended  Friedman  and 
Schwartz's  work  to  include  six  episodes  of  monetary  tightening 7 
after  1960  and  found  that  these  periods  were  followed  by 
contractions  in  industrial  production  and  increases  in 
unemployment.  Presumably  if  these  policy  changes  did  cause  real 
output  (and  thus  firms'  cash  flows)  to  decline,  stock  returns 
should  have  declined  when  the  policy  shocks  occurred.  However,  a 
sample  with  six  observations  is  too  small  to  use  in  inferring 
whether  monetary  policy  affects  stock  returns. 
Boschen  and Mills  (1995)  have  recently  employed  this  narrative 
approach  to  assemble  a  much  larger  sample  of  monetary  policy 
shocks.  They  constructed  an  index  of  monetary  policy  over  the 
1953:1-1991:lZ  period.  By examining  Federal  Open  Market  Committee 
records  and  similar  documents,  they  constructed  an  index  that 
classified  monetary  policy  into  five  categories:  strongly  anti- 
inflationary  (-2),  anti-inflationary  (-l), neutral  (O),  pro-growth 
(I),  and  strongly  pro-growth  (2).  They  foundthattheir  index  is 
predictably  correlated  with  money  market  indicators  of  monetary 
policy  such  as  innovations  in  the  federal  funds  rate  and 
nonborrowed  reserves. 
Boschen  and  Mills's  index  is  used  here  as  an  alternative  way 
to  test  whether  monetary  policy  affects  stock  returns.  To  do  this 
BRW's  stock  returns  are  regressed  on  the  variables  used  by  Chen, 
Roll,  and  Ross  (1986)  and  on  the  Boschen  and  Mills  index.  Chen, 
Roll,  and  Ross  used  the  Treasury  bond/Treasury  bill  spread  (the 
horizon  premium),  the  corporate  bond/Treasury  bond  spread  (the 
default  premium),  the  monthly  growth  rate  in industrial  production, 
unexpected  inflation,  and  the  change  in  expected  inflation.  To 8 
calculate  unexpected  inflation  they  first  determined  the  expected 
real  rate  on a one-month  Treasury  bill  using  the  method  of Fama  and 
Gibbons  (1984).  They  subtracted  this  from  the  nominal  Treasury 
bill  rate  (known  at  the  beginning  of  the  month)  to  calculate 
expected  inflation.  Unexpected  inflation  was  set  equal  to  the 
difference  between  actual  inflation  and  expected  inflation.  The 
change  in expected  inflation  was  set  equal  to  the  first  difference 
of the  expected  inflation  series.  Chen,  Roll,  and  Ross  argued  that 
each  of  the  series  that  they  used,  being  either  the  difference 
between  asset  returns  or  very  noisy,  could  be  treated  as 
innovations.  The Boschen  and Mills  index  numbers  were  also  treated 
as  innovations. 
The  22  industry  stock  return  equations  were  estimated  as  a 
system,  and  White's  (1984)  method  was  used  to  obtain 
heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.  Expected  inflation 
was  estimated  jointly  with  the  asset  return  equations.  The  sample 
period  employed  was  the  same  one  (1967:l  -  199O:lZ)  used  to 
estimate  the  vector  autoregressions. 
Data  on  the  horizon  premium,  the  default  premium,  inflation, 
and  the  return  on  Treasury  bills  were  obtained  from  Ibbotson 
Associates  (1994).  Data  on industrial  production  were  obtained  from 
the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape  (its mnemonic  is  IPN). 
C.  Event  Study  Evidence 9 
Cook  and  Hahn  (1989)  argued  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
controlled  the  federal  funds  rate  so  closely  during  the  1974-1979 
period  that  market  participants  were  able  to  discern  a  change  in 
the  funds  rate  target  on  the  day  that  it  occurred.  They  then 
collected  a sample  of 76 changes  in the  funds  rate  over  this  period 
from  Wall  Street  Journal  articles  on  the  business  days  following 
the  policy  changes." 
As  Jones  (1994)  discussed,  the  Fed  abandoned  federal  funds 
rate  targeting  in  1979.  From  1979-1982  it  targeted  nonborrowed 
reserves.  From  1982-1987,  it  focussed  on  a  borrowing  guideline. 
However,  with  the  appointment  of Alan  Greenspan  on  11 August  1987, 
the  funds  rate  again  became,  "the best  signalto  use  in determining 
when  he  [Greenspan]  is  changing  policy."5 
An  attempt  was  made  to  extend  Cook  and  Hahn's  data  set  by 
collecting  a  sample  of  federal  funds  rate  changes  during  the 
Greenspan  years  that  signalled  policy  changes.  A  key  word  search 
of  major  newspapers  over  the  11  August  1987  to  31  December  1994 
period  was  performed.  Every  reference  to  federal  funds  rate  was 
examined  to  see  whether  it  referred  to  a  policy-induced  change. 
Changes  in  the  funds  rate  due  to  technical  factors  such  as 
corporations  withdrawing  funds  from  the  banking  system  to meet  tax 
payments  were  excluded.  Actual  policy  changes  were  easy  to 
identify,  as  financial  market  observers  agree,  for  instance,  that 
there  were  23  funds  rate  cuts  between  June  1989  and  July  1992  (see 
Jones  (1994)  and  Grant  (1992))  and  six  increases  in  1994  ( see 
Bradsher  (1994)  and  Risen  (1994)).  Table  I  lists  the  dates  and amounts  of  the  federal 
changes  in  the  Dow  Jones 
Composite  Average  (DJCA) 
10 
funds  rate  changes  and  the  percentage 
Industrial  Average  (DJIA)  and  Dow  Jones 
over  the  24-hours  bracketing  the  funds 
rate  changes.  Data  on the  DJIA  and  DJCA  indexes  were  obtained  from 
the  Wall  Street  Journal  Index. 
The  following  ordinary  least  squares  regression  was  then 
estimated: 
APL =  PO  +  PI (AFF,)  (4) 
where  AP, is the  percentage  change  in the  DJIA  or the  DJCA  over  the 
24-hours  bracketing  the  news  of  the  funds  rate  change  and  AFF,.  is 
the  amount  (in  percentage  points)  by  which  the  Federal  Reserve 
changed  the  funds  rate.  P1 should  be  less  than  zero  if  news  of 
expansionary  (contractionary)  monetary  policy  is  an  event  that 
increases  (decreases)  future  cash  flows  or  decreases  (increases) 
the  discount  factors  at  which  those  cash  flows  are  capitalized. 
D.  Monetary  Policy  and  Ex-Ante  Returns 
The  three  approaches  discussed  above  all  investigate  the 
effects  of monetary  policy  shocks  on  ex-post  stock  returns.  It  is 
also  desirable  to  investigate  whether  monetary  policy  affects  ex- 
ante  returns.  In  a  multi-factor  model  such  as  the  Arbitrage 
Pricing  Theory  (Ross  (1976))  an  asset  must  pay  a  premium  to 11 
compensate  for  its  exposure  to  common  factors  but  not  for  its 
exposure  to  idiosyncratic  risks.  In ROSS'S  framework,  the  return 
Ri, on  asset  i at  time  t  can  be  written: 
Rit  =  %L +  zjPi  jthjt  +  CjPijtfjl  +  &it  (5) 
where  h,,  is the  risk-free  rate,  Pijt  measures  the  exposure  of  asset 
i to  factor  j, hj,  is the  risk  premium  associated  with  factor  j, fj, 
is  the  unexpected  change  in  factor  j, and  Ed, is  a mean-zero  error 
term.  The  ex-ante  expected  excess  return  in this  framework  is then 
given  by  a  beta-weighted  vector  of  risk  premia  (Zjpijthjt).  To 
investigate  whether  monetary  policy  affects  ex-ante  returns  it  is 
thus  necessary  to obtain  estimates  of assets'  monetary  policy  betas 
and  of  the  risk  premium  (if any)  associated  with  monetary  policy. 
To  do  this,  the  approach  of  McElroy  and  Burmeister  (1988)  is 
employed.  They  used  a  seemingly  unrelated  nonlinear  regression 
technique  to  simultaneously  estimate  the  risk  premia  and  the 
exposures  associated  with  observable  macroeconomic  factors.  This 
methodology  allowed  them  to  impose  the  nonlinear  cross-equation 
restrictions  that  the  intercept  terms  depend  on  the  risk  premia. 
Although  their  two-stage  approach  has  been  criticized,  it  does 
deliver  consistent  estimates  of the  risk  premia  and  the  exposures. 
It  is  thus  useful  for  measuring  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  (if 
any)  that  monetary  policy  has  on  ex-ante  returns. 
The  stock  return  data,  as  before,  were  for  the  22  industries 
that  BRW  investigated.  In  addition,  data  on  small  company  stocks 12 
(obtained  from  Ibbotson  Associates  (1994))  and  on  eight  other 
industries  were  included.6  These  last  nine  portfolios  were  used 
in an attempt  to increase  the  cross-sectional  variation  in expected 
returns. 
The  data  on  macroeconomic  factors  combined  variables  to 
measure  monetary  policy  with  the  factors  employed  by  Chen,  Roll, 
and  Ross  (1986).  Monetary  policy  was measured  first  by  innovations 
in the  funds  rate  from  the  VAR  model  described  above  and  second  by 
the  Boschen  and  Mills  index.  The  factors  employed  by  Chen,  Roll, 
and  Ross  (1986)  are  described  above.' 
The  sample  period  begins  in  1967:7  (because  the  original  VAR 
used  6 lags)  and  ends  in 1990:12.  Each  of the  regression  equations 
thus  has  275  degrees  of  freedom. 
II. Results 
Tables  II  -  V  report  the  results  of  the  VAR  estimation. 
Tables  II  and  III  indicate  that  in  the  initial  period  a  one- 
standard  deviation  positive  innovation  in the  funds  rate  depressed 
industry  stock  returns  by an average  of -0.81 percent  per  month  and 
a  one-standard  deviation  positive  innovation  in  nonborrowed 
reserves  increased  industry  stock  returns  by  an  average  of  1.7 
percent  per  month.  These  compound  to  annual  effect  of  -10.2 
percent  and  23.9  percent  respectively.  The  standard  errors 13 
indicate  that,  in  most  cases,  these  point  estimates  are 
statistically  different  from  zero.  Thus  expansionary 
(contractionary)  monetary  policy,  as  measured  by  innovations  in 
both  the  funds  rate  and  nonborrowed  reserves,  has  a  large  and 
statistically  significant  positive  (negative)  effect  on  stock 
returns. 
Tables  IV  and  V  present  the  percent  of  the  24-month  forecast 
error  variance  (FEV)  of  the  industry  stock  returns  that  is 
explained  by  innovations  in  monetary  policy.  Table  IV  indicates 
that  on  average  3.84  percent  of  the  FEV  of  industry  returns  is 
explained  by  funds  rate  innovations  and  Table  V  indicates  that  on 
average  14.49  percent  of  the  FEV  of  industry  returns  is  explained 
by  nonborrowed  reserves  innovations.  The  standard  errors  show 
that,  in  most  cases,  these  FEVs  are  statistically  different  from 
zero.  Thus  monetary  policy  innovations  explain  a  substantial 
fraction  of  industry  stock  returns. 
Table  VI  reports  the  results  of  the  estimation  using  the 
Boschen  and  Mills  index.  It indicates  that  a one-unit  increase  in 
the  index  (e.g.,  a change  in monetary  policy  from  neutral  to  pro- 
growth)  would  increase  industry  stock  returns  by an average  of 0.83 
percent  per  month.  This  compounds  to  an  annual  effects  of  10.4 
percent.  The  standard  errors  indicate  that,  in most  cases,  these 
point  estimates  are  statistically  different  from  zero.  Thus 
expansionary  (contractionary)  monetary  policy,  as  measured  by  the 
Boschen  and  Mills  index,  has  a large  and  statistically  significant 
positive  (negative)  effect  on  stock  returns. 14 
The  results  of  regressing  the  DJIA  index  on  news  of  federal 
funds  rate  changes  were  (with  t-statistics  in parentheses): 
AD JIA,  =  0.226  -  1.44aFF,. 
(1.34)  (-2.35) 
R-squared  =  0.05,  Std.  Error  of  Regression  =  1.82,  N  =  116 
The  results  of  regressing  the  DJCA  index  on  news  of  funds  rate 
changes  were: 
ADJCA,  =  0.092  -  l.O4aFF, 
(0.79)  (-2.47) 
R-squared  =  0.05,  Std.  Error  of  Reg  ression  =  1.25,  N=  116 
Thus  there  is  a  statistically  significant  negative  relationship 
between  policy-induced  changes  in the  funds  rate  and  changes  in the 
DJIA  and  the  DJCA.  This  finding  is consistent  with  the  hypothesis 
that  expansionary  (contractionary)  monetary  policy  is an event  that 
increases  (decreases)  future  cash  flows  or  decreases  (increases) 
the  discount  factors  at  which  those  cash  flows  are  capitalized. 
Table  VII  reports  the  results  obtained  from  estimating  the 
multi-factor  model.  When  monetary  policy  was  measured  using  the 
funds  rate  the  risk  premium  equalled  -0.57  percent  per  month  and 
the  mean  absolute  value  of  the  22 monetary  policy  betas  was  -1.06 
percent  per  month.  When  monetary  policy  was  measured  using  the 
Boschen  and  Mills  index  the  risk  premium  equalled  1.10  percent  per 
month  and  the  mean  absolute  value  of  the  22  monetary  policy  betas 
was  0.68  percent  per  month.  These  results  imply  that  on  average 
the  expected  return  on  a stock  decreased  by  0.60  percent  per  month 15 
when  monetary  policy  was  measured  by  the  funds  rate  and  by  0.75 
percent  per  month  when  monetary  policy  was  measured  by  the  Boschen 
and  Mills  index.  These  compound  to  annual  effects  of  7.5  percent 
and  9.4  percent  respectively.  For  the  five  industries  with  the 
largest  exposures  to monetary  policy,  these  annual  effects  averaged 
10.4  percent  when  the  funds  rate  was  used  and  13.4  percent  when  the 
Boschen  and  Mills  index  was  used.  These  results  indicate  that 
monetary  policy  is  a common  factor  and  that  assets  must  pay  large 
positive  premiums  to  compensate  for  their  exposures  to  it. 
The  important  implication  of  the  results  presented  above  is 
that  monetary  policy  has  real  effects,  and  that  these  effects  are 
quantitatively  important.  Whether  monetary  policy  is measured  by 
funds  rate  innovations,  by  the  Boschen  and  Mills  index,  by 
nonborrowed  reserves  innovations,  or  by  an  event  study  of  funds 
rate  changes,  the  results  indicate  that  expansionary 
(contractionary)  monetary  policy  causes  stock  returns  in  almost 
every  industry  examined  to  increase  (decrease)."  A  one-standard 
deviation  negative  shock  to  the  funds  rate  increases  returns  by  an 
average  annual  rate  of  10.2  percent;  a  one-unit  increase  in  the 
Boschen  and  Mills  index  increases  annual  returns  by  an  average 
annual  rate  of  10.4  percent;  a  one-standard  deviation  positive 
shock  to  nonborrowed  reserves  increases  returns  by  an  average 
annual  rate  of  23.9  percent,  and  a  100  basis  point  policy-induced 
decline  in  the  funds  rate  increases  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial 
Average  the  same  day  by  an average  of  1.44  percent.  Thus  monetary 
policy  not  only  has  real  effects  on  ex-post  returns,  but  also  has 16 
effects  that  are  quantitatively  important.  This  evidence  suggests 
that  monetary  policy  might  also  affect  ex-ante  returns.  The 
results  of  estimating  a multi-factor  model  indicate  that  monetary 
policy  is  a  common  factor  and  that  exposure  to  it  increases  an 
asset's  ex-ante  return  on  average  by  7.5  percent  (when  monetary 
policy  is  measured  using  the  funds  rate)  or  9.4  percent  (when 
policy  is  measured  using  the  Boschen  and  Mills  index).  Thus  the 
evidence  indicates  that  monetary  policy  matters,  not  only  for  ex- 
post  returns  but  also  for  ex-ante  returns. 
III.  Conclusion  and  Implications  for  Research 
Boudoukh,  Richardson,  and Whitelaw  (1994),  employing  a money- 
neutral  model,  presented  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence  to 
explain  the  expected  inflation/stock  return  correlation.  In 
concluding  they  stated  that  whether  monetary  policy  matters,  and 
whether  it  has  quantitatively  important  effects,  remain  open 
questions.  This  paper  addresses  these  questions  by  examining  how 
BRW's  industry  stock  return  data  respond  to monetary  policy  shocks. 
Theory  posits  that  stock  prices  equal  the  expected  present  value  of 
future  net  cash  flows.  Thus  evidence  that  positive  monetary  shocks 
increase  industry  stock  returns  indicates  that  expansionary 
monetary  policy  exerts  real  effects  by  increasing  future  cash  flows 
or by decreasing  the  discount  factors  at which  those  cash  flows  are 
capitalized.  Using  several  measures  of  monetary  policy  and  a 17 
variety  of  empirical  techniques,  this  paper  presents  evidence  that 
monetary  policy  exerts  large  effects  on  ex-ante  and  ex-post  stock 
returns.  These  findings  support  the  hypothesis  that  monetary 
policy,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  has  real  and  quantitatively 
important  effects  on  the  economy. 
The  results  presented  here  suggest  several  directions  of 
future  research  for  financial  economists.  First,  while  the 
evidence  above  indicates  that  monetary  policy  is a common  factor  it 
does  not  reveal  why  it  affects  stock  returns.  To  answer  this 
question  the  approach  of  Campbell  and  Mei  (1993)  would  be  useful. 
They  have  shown  that  an  asset's  beta  with  a  common  factor  can  be 
decomposed  into  portions  representing  the  covariance  of news  about 
1)  expected  future  cash  flows,  2)  expected  future  interest  rates, 
and  3) expected  excess  returns  with  the  risk  factor.  Thus  Campbell 
and  Mei's  methodology  can  shed  light  on the  channels  through  which 
monetary  policy  affects  stock  returns. 
A  second  direction  for  future  research  builds  on  the  work  of 
Fama  and  French  (1995).  They  argued  that  firm  size  proxies  for 
sensitivity  to  an unknown  risk  factor.  They  also  found  that  small 
stocks  have  lower  earnings  on book  equity  than  big  stocks  because, 
while  both  were  harmed  by  the  recession  of  1981-1982,  big  but  not 
small  stocks  benefitted  from  the  subsequent  expansion.  The  finding 
presented  here  that  monetary  policy  is  a risk  factor  coupled  with 
the  theoretical  framework  of  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1994)  and  the 
empirical  evidence  reported  in Thorbecke  and Coppock  (1995) provide 
a possible  explanation  for  Fama  and  French's  results.  Gertler  and 18 
Gilchrist  have  argued  that  a  monetary  tightening,  by  increasing 
interest  rates,  worsens  firms'  cash  flow  net  of  interest  and  thus 
their  balance  sheet  positions.  They  then  argued  that  the  spending 
of  small  firms  is more  dependent  on  their  balance  sheet  positions 
because  their  lower  collateralizable  net  worth  constrains  their 
access  to  credit.  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  further  argued  that  these 
credit  constraints  bind  a  larger  number  of  small  firms  in  a 
downturn,  implying  that  changes  in  monetary  policy  should  have  a 
larger  effect  on  small  firms  in bad  times  than  in  good  times. 
Building  on  this  insight,  Thorbecke  and  Coppock  found  that 
tight  monetary  policy  during  the  1981-1982  recession  harmed  both 
small  and  large  firms  while  easier  monetary  policy  during  the 
subsequent  expansion  benefited  large  but  not  small  firms.  The 
evidence  of  an  asymmetric  response  of  small  stocks  to  monetary 
shocks  in  recessions  and  expansions  together  with  the  finding  that 
monetary  policy  is a common  factor  suggests  that  it might  be  one  of 
the  state  variables  that  produces  the  size-related  variation  in 
returns  discussed  by  Fama  and  French. 
A third  direction  for  future  research  concerns  an explanation 
for  the  unexpected  inflation/stock  return  correlation.  Boudoukh, 
Richardson,  and  Whitelaw  presented  evidence  explaining  the 
expected  inflation/stock  return  correlation.Y  One  explanation  for 
the  unexpected  inflation/stock  return  correlation  has  been 
presented  by  Tobin  (1978,  1988).  Tobin  argued  that  financial 
markets  believe  that  news  of  inflation  will  generate  a  monetary 
tightening  by  the  Federal  Reserve  that  will  reduce  the  present 19 
value  of  future  earnings  and  thus  current  stock  returns.  Since 
many  authors  (e.g.,  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992)  and  Fuhrer  and 
Moore  (1995))  have  demonstrated  that  news  of  inflation  causes  the 
Federal  Reserve  to  tighten  monetary  policy,  the  evidence  here 
indicating  that  tighter  monetary  policy  depresses  stock  returns  is 
consistent  with  Tobin's  hypothesis.  Future  research  should 
investigate  the  extent  to  which  Tobin's  hypothesis  can  explain  the 
puzzling  finding  that  stocks,  which  represent  claims  against  real 
assets,  do  not  provide  good  hedges  against  unexpected  changes  in 
inflation. 20 
Table  I 
Changes  in  the  Federal  Funds  Rate  and  Stock  Returns 
The  sample  contains  116 policy-induced  changes  in the  federal  funds 
rate  over  the  September  1974  -  December  1994  period.  Funds  rate 
changes  for  the  1974-1979  period  were  collected  by  Cook  and  Hahn 
(1989)  from  Wall  Street  Journal  articles  on the  first  business  day 
following  the  policy  change.  Funds  rate  changes  after  this  were 
collected  from  a  key  word  search  of  major  newspapers.  Data  on 
percentage  changes  in  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average  (DJIA)  and 
the  Dow  Jones  Composite  Average  (DJCA)  over  the  24-hour  period 
bracketing  news  of  the  policy  change  were  obtained  from  the  Wall 
Street  Journal  Index. 
Change  in  Percentage  Change  in  Stock  Prices 
Date  Funds  Rate  DJIA  DJCA 
































0.50  0.64  0.51 
0.50  1.33  1.12 
0.25  -1.13  -1.11 
0.25  -0.06  -0.80 
0.25  -2.46  -2.04 
-0.25  -0.31  -0.46 
-0.50  -0.71  -0.70 
-0.25  1.36  1.75 
-0.50  0.69  0.79 
-0.25  -0.09  -0.01 
-0.25  0.24  0.19 
-0.25  -0.09  -0.07 
-0.25  -0.74  0.63 
-0.25  1.27  1.04 
-0.25  0.38  0.17 
-0.25  -0.28  -0.63 
-0.50  -0.21  -0.38 
-0.25  -0.53  -0.08 
-0.25  0  0.32 
-0.25  -0.48  -0.49 
-0.25  0.59  0.47 
-0.25  -0.24  -0.47 
-0.25  1.26  1.07 
-0.25  -0.29  -0.21 
-0.25  0.58  0.72 
-0.25  3.37  -0.42 
-0.50  1.15  1.08 
-0.25  1.03  1.23 
-0.25  0.63  0.35 
0.5  0.24  0.45 
0.125  -0.06  -0.28 21 
Table  I -  Continued 
8/11/88  0.375 
5/25/88  0.25 
5/14/88  0.25 
4/5/88  0.25 
10/21/87  -0.25 
10/20/87  -0.75 
10/8/87  0.20 
g/19/79  0.125 
g/4/79  0.125 
8/24/79  0.25 
8/15/79  0.375 
7/20/79  0.375 
4/27/79  0.188 
l/15/79  0.125 
12/19/78  0.125 
11/28/78  0.125 
11/l/78  0.25 
10/31/78  0.375 
10/26/78  0.125 
10/20/78  0.125 
10/18/78  0.125 
g/28/78  0.125 
g/25/78  0.125 
g/25/78  0.125 
g/20/78  0.125 
g/8/78  0.125 
8/28/78  0.125 
8/18/78  0.125 
8/16/78  0.125 
7/20/78  0.125 
6/21/78  0.25 
5/18/78  0.25 
4/27/78  0.25 
4/19/78  0.25 
10/31/77  0.25 
10/7/77  0.125 
9/30/7-I  0.125 
g/22/77  0.125 
g/9/77  0.125 
8/12/77  0.125 
8/9/77  0.125 
7/28/77  0.25 
5/19/77  0.125 
5/10/77  0.125 
4/27/77  0.125 
4/25/77  0.125 
12/14/76  -0.125 
Change  in  Percentaqe  Chanqe  in  Stock  Prices 
Date  Funds  Rate  DJIA  DJCA 
































































































Table  I -  Continued 
Change  in  Percentage  Change  in  Stock  Prices 
Date  Funds  Rate  DJIA  DJCA 
11/19/76  -0.25  -0.14  -0.12 
10/8/76  -0.25  -1.21  -0.99 
7/9/76  -0.25  1.12  1.06 
5/19/76  0.125  -0.06  0.10 
5/14/76  0.125  -0.85  -0.52 
5/12/76  0.125  -0.09  -0.11 
5/5/76  0.125  -0.72  -0.52 
4/23/76  0.125  -0.70  -0.55 
3/30/76  -0.125  -0.53  -0.56 
2/27/76  0.25  -0.64  -0.56 
l/6/76  -0.126  1.48  1.43 
11/12/75  -0.125  1.63  1.54 
11/7/75  -0.125  -0.61  -0.34 
10/21/75  -0.375  0.54  0.66 
10/3/75  -0.125  2.35  1.99 
7/22/75  0.125  -0.93  -1.13 
7/21/75  0.125  -0.89  -0.67 
7/16/75  0.125  -1.10  -1.01 
6/20/75  0.50  1.19  0.76 
5/8/75  -0.25  0.49  0.44 
3/26/75  -0.25  2.45  2.14 
2/21/75  -0.25  0.59  0.44 
2/14/75  -0.25  1.00  0.59 
2/13/75  -0.25  1.66  1.27 
l/31/75  -0.50  1.04  0.91 
l/14/75  -0.25  0.84  -0.80 
l/7/75  -0.25  0.63  0.33 
l/6/75  -0.25  0.42  0.97 
l/3/75  -0.25  0.39  0.82 
l/2/75  -0.25  2.56  2.79 
12/16/75  -0.25  -1.00  -0.92 
12/3/74  -0.25  -1.06  -1.21 
10/18/74  -0.50  -0.53  0.83 
10/4/74  -0.25  -0.52  0.22 
g/23/74  -0.25  -1.05  -0.56 
g/13/74  -0.50  -2.16  -2.35 Table  II 
Impulse  Response  of  Industry  Stock  Returns  to  One-Standard 
Deviation  Shock  to  the  Federal  Funds  Rate  (FF). 
The  coefficients  in  the  Table  represents  the  7,4th  element  of  the 
matrix  To in  the  orthogonalized  moving  average  process: 
y,.  =  roz),  f r,u,._1  + r2Ut-2  +  .  .  . 
where  yt  is  a  (7  x  1)  vector  whose  elements  are  industrial 
production  growth  (IPN),  the  inflation  rate  (IFN),  the  log  of  an 
index  of  sensitive  commodity  prices  (CP),  FF,  the  log  of 
nonborrowed  reserves  (NBR),  the  log  of  total  reserves  (TR),  and 
stock  returns  in  industry  k  (SR,).  The  order  of  the  variables  in 
the  vector  yt  is  the  same  as  the  order  in  which  they  are  listed 
above.  Thus  the  7,4th  element  of  the  matrix  To  measures  the 
response  of  SR, in  the  initial  period  to  a  one-standard  deviation 
shock  to FF.  The  original  vector  autoregression  was  estimated  with 
a  constant  and  six  lags.  The  sample  period  extends  from  January 
1967  to  December  1990.  Data  on  IPN,  IFN,  CP,  FF,  NBR,  and  TR  were 
obtained  from  the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape.  The  mnemonics  for 
these  variables  are,  respectively,  IPN,  PCU,  PZALL,  FFED,  FARAN, 
and  FARAT.  Data  on  SR,  are  for  two-digit  SIC  industries  and 
represent  equally  weighted  averages  of  individual  firms'  returns 
obtained  from  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices  database. 
Response  to  One-Standard 
Industry  Deviation  Shock  to  FF  (Std.  Error) 
Apparel  -0.00509  (0.00376) 
Chemicals  -0.00642  (0.00313) 
Clay,  Glass,  and  Stone  -0.00945  (0.00318) 
Electrical  Machinery  -0.00735  (0.00424) 
Food  and  Beverage  -0.00773  (0.00280) 
Furniture  -0.00950  (0.00339) 
Instruments  -0.00741  (0.00374) 
Leather  -0.00662  (0.00104) 
Lumber  -0.0142  (0.00527) 
Metal  Products  -0.00774  (0.00323) 
Mining  -0.0134  (0.00374) 
Misc.  Manufacturing  -0.00776  (0.00395) 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  -0.00894  (0.00363) 
Paper  -0.00884  (0.00333) 
Petroleum  Products  -0.0076  (0.00331) 
Primary  Metals  -0.00879  (0.00338) 
Printing  and  Publishing  -0.00664  (0.00331) 
Rubber  and  Plastics  -0.00791  (0.00321) 
Textiles  -0.00635  (0.00362) 
Tobacco  -0.00583  (0.00259) 
Transportation  Equipment  -0.00803  (0.00386) 
Utilities  -0.00662  (0.00186) 24 
Table  III 
Impulse  Response  of  Industry  Stock  Returns  to  One-Standard 
Deviation  Shock  to  the  Log  of  Nonborrowed  Reserves  (NBR). 
The  coefficients  in  the  Table  represents  the  7,4th  element  of  the 
matrix  To in  the  orthogonalized  moving  average  process: 
=  roz),  + I-$,_,  + I-2X)-Z  +  .  .  . 
where  y,  is  a  (7y'  x  1)  vector  whose  elements  are  industrial 
production  growth  (IPN),  the  inflation  rate  (IFN),  the  log  of  an 
index  of  sensitive  commodity  prices  (CP),  NBR,  the  federal  funds 
rate  (FF),  the  log  of  total  reserves  (TR),  and  stock  returns  in 
industry  k  (SR,).  The  order  of  the  variables  in  the  vector  yt is 
the  same  as  the  order  in  which  they  are  listed  above.  Thus  the 
7,4th  element  of  the  matrix  To measures  the  response  of  SR, in  the 
initial  period  to  a  one-standard  deviation  shock  to  NBR.  The 
original  vector  autoregression  was  estimated  with  a  constant  and 
two  lags.  The  sample  period  extends  from  October  1979  to  August 
1982.  Data  on  IPN,  IFN,  CP,  NBR,  FF,  and  TR were  obtained  from  the 
Haver  Analytics  data  tape.  The  mnemonics  for  these  variables  are, 
respectively,  IPN,  PCU,  PZALL,  FARAN,  FFED,  and  FARAT.  Data  on  SR, 
are  for  two-digit  SIC  industries  and  represent  equally  weighted 
averages  of  individual  firms'  returns  obtained  from  the  Center  for 
Research  in  Security  Prices  database. 
Industry 
Response  to  One-Standard 
Deviation  Shock  to  FF  (Std.  Error) 
Apparel  0.0107 
Chemicals  0.0169 
Clay,  Glass,  and  Stone  0.0256 
Electrical  Machinery  0.0151 
Food  and  Beverage  0.0119 
Furniture  0.0190 
Instruments  0.0227 
Leather  0.0101 
Lumber  0.0223 
Metal  Products  0.0153 
Mining  0.0285 
Misc.  Manufacturing  0.0126 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  0.0221 
Paper  0.0186 
Petroleum  Products  0.0314 
Primary  Metals  0.0208 
Printing  and  Publishing  0.0194 
Rubber  and  Plastics  0.0137 
Textiles  0.0125 
Tobacco  0.0114 
Transportation  Equipment  0.0134 






















(0.00504) Table  IV 
Percent  of 24-Month  Forecast  Error  Variance  (FEV) of Industry  Stock 
Returns  Accounted  for by  Innovations  in the  Federal  Funds  Rate  (FF) 
The  contribution  of FF  shocks  to  the  FEV  of  industry  stock  returns 
is  estimated  using  a  VAR  system  yt  with  industrial  production 
growth  (IPN),  the  inflation  rate  (IFN),  the  log  of  an  index  of 
sensitive  commodity  prices  (CP),  FF,  the  log  of  nonborrowed 
reserves  (NBR),  the  log of total  reserves  (TR), stock  returns  in an 
industry  (SR,),  a  constant,  and  six  lags.  Yt  depends  on 
orthogonalized  innovations  in  all  the  variables  (U,_i): 
Yt = rou, + &z),_]  + r7u,_2  +  .  .  . 
The  percentage  contribution  of  an  innovation  in  variable  j to  the 
24-month  FEV  of  variable  i is  then  given  by: 
100  x  ;3rs,ij7  ,42 
23 
x r&. 
s=o  j=l  s=O 
The  contribution  of  an  innovation  in FF  to  the  24-month  FEV  of  SR 
is  reported  below.  The  order  of  orthogonalization  in  calculating 
this  was  IPN,  IFN,  CP,  FF,  NBR,  TR,  and  SR,.  The  sample  period 
extends  from  January  1967  to December  1990.  Data  on  IPN,  IFN,  CP, 
FF,  NBR,  and  TR  were  obtained  from  the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape. 
The  mnemonics  for  these  variables  are,  respectively,  IPN,  PCU, 
PZALL,  FFED,  FARAN,  and  FARAT.  Data  on  SR, are  for  two-digit  SIC 
industries  and  represent  equally  weighted  averages  of  individual 
firms'  returns  obtained  from  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security 
Prices  database. 
Industry 
Percent  of  24-month  FEV 
Explained  by  FF  innovation  (Std.  Error) 
Apparel  2.37  (0.94) 
Chemicals  2.82  (1.15) 
Clay,  Glass,  and  Stone  4.60  (1.60) 
Electrical  Machinery  4.30  (1.03) 
Food  and  Beverage  3.51  (1.76) 
Furniture  3.97  (1.37) 
Instruments  3.78  (1.06) 
Leather  2.97  (1.20) 
Lumber  3.61  (1.54) 
Metal  Products  4.03  (1.32) 
Mining  6.25  (2.19) 
Misc.  Manufacturing  3.11  (1.20) 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  4.86  (1.31) 
Paper  3.26  (1.17) 
Petroleum  Products  3.18  (1.23) 
Primary  Metals  4.92  (1.50) 
Printing  and  Publishing  3.37  (1.21) 
Rubber  and  Plastics  4.00  (1.24) 
Textiles  2.48  (1.04) 
Tobacco  3.01  (1.24) 
Transportation  Equipment  3.70  (1.21) 
Utilities  5.13  (2.03) 26 
Table  V 
Percent  of 24-Month  Forecast  Error  Variance  (FEV) of  Industry  Stock 
Returns  Accounted  for by  Innovations  in Nonborrowed  Reserves  (NBR) 
The  contribution  of NBR  shocks  to the  FEV  of industry  stock  returns 
estimated  using  a  VAR  system  yt 
;:owth  (IPN) 
with  industrial  production 
the  inflation  rate  (IFN),  the  log  of  an  index  of 
sensitive  cokmodity  prices  (CP),  the  federal  funds  rate  (FF),  the 
log  of nonborrowed  reserves  (NBR),  the  log  of total  reserves  (TR), 
stock  returns  in  industry  k  (SR,), a  constant,  and  two  lags.  yt 
depends  on  orthogonalized  innovations  in  all  the  variables  (U,_i)  : 
Yt  =  l?oz),  +  rlz),_i  +  rzz),_i  +  e a * 
The  percentage  contribution  of  an  innovation  in  variable  j to  the 
24-month  FEV  of  variable  i is  then  given  by: 
100  x  :3rs,ijz  ,4c 
23 
z rs,ij2. 
s=o  j=l  s=O 
The  contribution  of  an  innovation  in NBR  to  the  24-month  FEV  of  SR 
is  reported  below.  The  order  of  orthogonalization  in  calculating 
this  was  IPN,  IFN,  CP,  NBR,  FF,  TR,  and  SR,.  The  sample  period 
extends  from  October  1979  to  August  1982.  Data  on  IPN,  IFN,  CP, 
FF,  NBR,  and  TR  were  obtained  from  the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape. 
The  mnemonics  for  these  variables  are,  respectively,  IPN,  PCU, 
PZALL,  FFED,  FARAN,  and  FARAT.  Data  on  SR, are  for  two-digit  SIC 
industries  and  represent  equally  weighted  averages  of  individual 
firms'  returns  obtained  from  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security 
Prices  database. 
Percent  of  24-month  FEV 
Industry  Explained  by  FF  innovation  (Std.  Error) 
Apparel  9.24  (5.68) 
Chemicals  16.37  (6.40) 
Clay,  Glass,  and  Stone  19.44  (8.51) 
Electrical  Machinery  13.83  (5.00) 
Food  and  Beverage  12.09  (4.69) 
Furniture  13.76  (6.50) 
Instruments  17.53  (6.06) 
Leather  8.42  (5.92) 
Lumber  13.82  (5.99) 
Metal  Products  13.70  (5.44) 
Mining  18.30  (6.40) 
Misc.  Manufacturing  12.93  (4.72) 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  19.63  (6.07) 
Paper  14.49  (6.37) 
Petroleum  Products  19.28  (8.45) 
Primary  Metals  14.13  (6.50) 
Printing  and  Publishing  16.69  (7.03) 
Rubber  and  Plastics  11.61  (5.83) 
Textiles  11.38  (5.18) 
Tobacco  7.51  (1.24) 
Transportation  Equipment  13.03  (5.15) 
Utilities  21.69  (9.24) 27 
Table VI 
The Relation Between  Industry Stock Returns  and 
Narrative  Evidence of Monetary  Policy. 
The  table  reports  each  industry's  monetary  policy  beta.  Industry 
stock  return  data  are  for  two-digit  SIC  industries  and  represent 
equally  weighted  averages  of  individual  firms'  returns  obtained 
from  the  Center  for Research  in Security  Prices  database.  Monetary 
policy  is  measured  by  the  Boschen  and  Mills  (1995)  index  of  the 
stance  of  monetary  policy.  The  other  right  hand  side  variables 
were  the  horizon  premium,  the  default  premium,  the  growth  rate  of 
industrial  production,  unexpected  inflation,  and  the  change  in 
expected  inflation.  Expected  inflation  was  obtained  by  subtracting 
the  expected  real  rate  on  a  one-month  Treasury  bill  (calculated 
using  the  method  of  Fama  and  Gibbons  (1984))  from  the  nominal 
Treasury  bill  rate  known  at the beginning  of the  month.  Unexpected 
inflation  equals  the  difference  between  actual  inflation  and 
expected  inflation.  The  change  in expected  inflation  is the  first 
difference  of  the  expected  inflation  series.  Data  on  the  horizon 
premium,  the  default  premium,  inflation,  and  Treasury  bill  returns 
were  obtained  from  Ibbotson  Associates  (1994).  Data  on the  growth 
rate  of  industrial  production  were  obtained  from  the  Haver 
Analytics  data  tape  (mnemonic  =  IPN).  The  sample  period  extends 
from  January  1967  to  December  1990.  All  estimation  is  performed 
jointly  and  the  standard  errors  are  adjusted  for 
heteroskedasticity. 
Industry  Monetary  Policy  Beta  (Std.  Error) 
Apparel 
Chemicals 
Clay, Glass,  and  Stone 
Electrical  Machinery 





Metal  Products 
Mining 
Misc.  Manufacturing 
Nonelectrical  Machinery 
Paper 
Petroleum  Products 
Primary  Metals 
Printing  and  Publishing 
Rubber  and  Plastics 
Textiles 
Tobacco 
Transportation  Equipment 
Utilities 
0.0140  (0.0049) 
0.0061  (0.0034) 
0.0085  (0.0037) 
0.0108  (0.0048) 
0.0070  (0  -0030) 
0.0111  (0.0043) 
0.0084  (0.0044) 
0.0150  (0.0041) 
0.0109  (0.0065) 
0.0090  (0.0041) 
-0.0015  (0.0047) 
0.0083  (0.0045) 
0.0091  (0.0041) 
0.0064  (0.0036) 
0.0005  (0.0039) 
0.0054  (0.0039) 
0.0077  (0.0039) 
0.0127  (0.0040) 
0.0142  (0.0042) 
0.0025  (0.0028) 
0.0122  (0.0043) 
0.0031  (0.0020) 28 
Table  VII 
Nonlinear  Seemingly  Unrelated  Regression  (NLSUR)  Estimates  of  the 
Risk  Premiums  Associated  with  Macroeconomic  Factors 
The  risk  premia  are  NLSUR  estimates  of  the  hj,  in  the 
equation: 
Ri, = h", +  CjPijtfjt  +  cjP,  jihit  +  &jt 
where  Ri,  represents  the  return  at time  t on an  industry  portfolio, 
h  o1 is  the  return  on  one-month  Treasury  bills,  pii,  is  the  exposure 
of  asset  i to  the  macroeconomic  factor  j,  fj, is the  innovation  in 
the  macroeconomic  factor  j, hj,  is the  risk  premium  associated  with 
macroeconomic  factor  j, and  Ed,  captures  the  effect  of idiosyncratic 
factors  on  Ri,.  Industry  stock  return  data  are  for  two-digit  SIC 
industries  and  represent  equally  weighted  averages  of  individual 
firms'  returns  obtained  from  the  Center  for  Research  in  Security 
Prices  database.  The  macroeconomic  factors  are  monetary  policy, 
the  horizon  premium,  the  default  premium,  the  growth  rate  of 
industrial  production,  unexpected  inflation,  and  the  change  in 
expected  inflation.  Monetary  policy  is  measured  either  by  the 
Boschen  and Mills  (1995)  index  or by  federal  funds  rate  innovations 
from  a VAR  system  composed  of  industrial  production  growth  (IPN), 
the  inflation  rate  (PCU),  the  log  of  an  index  of  sensitive 
commodity  prices  (PZALL)  ,  the  federal  funds  rate  (FFED), 
nonborrowed  reserves  (FARAN),  and  the  lo9  of  total  reserves 
(FARAT).  Expected  inflation  was  obtained  by  subtracting  the 
expected  real  rate  on  a one-month  Treasury  bill  (calculated  using 
the  method  of  Fama  and  Gibbons  (1984))  from  the  nominal  Treasury 
bill  rate  known  at  the  beginning  of  the  month.  Unexpected 
inflation  equals  the  difference  between  actual  inflation  and 
expected  inflation.  The  change  in expected  inflation  is the  first 
difference  of  the  expected  inflation  series.  Data  on  the  horizon 
premium,  the  default  premium,  inflation,  and  Treasury  bill  returns 
were  obtained  from  Ibbotson  Associates  (1994).  Data  on  variables 
in the  VAR  system  were  obtained  from  the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape. 
The  Haver  mnemonics  are  in  parentheses  next  to  these  variables. 
The  sample  period  extends  from  July  1967  to  December  1990. 
Risk  (Std.  Risk  (Std. 
Macroeconomic  Factor  Premium  Error)  Premium  Error) 
Boschen  & Mills  Index  1.10  0.39 
Federal  Funds  Rate  -0.57  0.25 
The  Horizon  Premium  0.95  0.48  1.18  0.60 
The  Default  Premium  -1.06  0.39  -1.09  0.48 
Industrial  Production  -0.0063  0.0023  -0.0081  0.0030 
Unexpected  Inflation  0.00006  0.00074  0.0014  0.0011 
Change  in 
Expected  Inflation  -0.0015  0.00055  -0.0020  0.0008 29 
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NOTES 
*  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  and  George 
Mason  University.  I thank  Jacob  Boudoukh  for  kindly  providing  the 
industry  stock  return  data. 
1.  The  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the  k-period-ahead  forecast 
error  is: 
Var  k  +k  -  E (YttkIYLrYt_~rYt_zr  . . .)  I  =  u-o  + ru  + . . . + m-d  - 
The  contribution  of  the  jth  orthogonalized  innovation  to  the  k- 
period-ahead  FEV  is: 
To,  jro, jf  +  rl,  jrl,  j’  +  . . .  +  rk-1,  irk-l,j’  r 
where  ro,j  is  the  jth  column  of  the  matrix  r,.  The  contribution  of 
an  innovation  in the  jth  variable  to  the  k-period-ahead  FEV  in the 
ith  variable  is  then  given  by: 
k-l 
I;  rs,ij2  fi 
k-l 
’  rs,ij2f 
s=o  j=l  s=O 
where  r,,ij  is  the  ijth  element  of  the  matrix  r,. 
2. Since  this  sample  period  contains  only  34 observations,  this  VAR 
system  was  estimated  with  two  lags  of  each  of  the  variables. 
3.  October  1987,  the  month  of the  October  19th  stock  market  crash 
and  the  subsequent  easing  of  monetary  policy  on  October  20th  and 
21st,  was  deleted  from  the  estimation  in this  and the  next  section. 
4.  Cook  and  Hahn  (1989)  showed  that  increases  (decreases)  in  the 
funds  rate  over  the  1974-1979  period  were  correlated  with  increases 
(decreases)  in  short  and  long  term  interest  rates.  Thorbecke  and 
Alami  (1994)  showed  that  these  increases  (decreases)  over  the  1974- 
1979  period  were  correlated  with  decreases  (increases)  in  stock 
returns. 
5.  Jones  (1994)  p.  95. 
6.  I thank  Jacob  Boudoukh  for  kindly  providing  the  data  for  all 
thirty  industries. 33 
7.  Thorbecke  and  Coppock  (1995)  also  estimated  a  multi-factor 
model  including  a measure  of monetary  policy.  The  estimation  here 
differs  because  the  sample  period  is much  longer,  because  both  VAR 
and  narrative  indicators  are  used  to  measure  monetary  policy,  and 
because  BRW's  data  set  is  used. 
8.  The  fact  that  four  different  measures  of  monetary  policy  all 
yielded  similar  results  implies  that  our  findings  are  not  merely 
capturing  an interest  rate  effect  but  rather  are providing  evidence 
concerning  how  monetary  shocks  affect  stock  returns. 
9.  It  seems  probable  that  a result  which  has  puzzled  scholars  for 
as  long  as  the  negative  inflation/stock  return  correlation  has 
should  have  more  than  one  cause.  In addition  to BRW's  explanation, 
another  interesting  hypothesis  has  been  advanced  by  Stulz  (1986). 
He  argued  that  an  increase  in  expected  inflation,  by  decreasing 
real  wealth,  could  decrease  real  interest  rates  and  the  expected 
real  rate  on  the  market  portfolio. 